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INTERNATIONAL LAW-EXTRAJUDICIAL
KILLINGS: ACTS OF TERRORISM OR ACTS OF
ELABORATE COVER-UPS?-SULLIVAN V.
REPUBLIC OF CUBA, 891 F.3D 6 (1ST CIR.2018).
Ordinarily, a country is immune from being subjected to legal
proceedings in another country.' To enumerate this protection, the United
States codified the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), which
limits the possibility for foreign sovereign nations to be sued in United
States' courts.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
faced the issue in Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba3 , of whether the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act's terrorism exception applies to the extrajudicial

I

See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258, SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST
STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM: BACKGROUND ON STATE IMMUNITY 3-5 (2008) (explaining
immunity custom afforded to sovereign states); see also Peter-Tobias Stoll, State Immunity,
OXFORD PUB. INT'L LAW, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-el106?print=pdf (last updated Apr. 2011) [https://perma.cc/A93H-6BMA]
(defining state immunity). "State immunity protects a State and its property from the jurisdiction
of the courts of another State. It covers administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings
(jurisdictional immunity), as well as enforcement measures (enforcement immunity)." Stoll, supra,
note 1. See How Do You Go About Suing a Country?, NPR (Oct. 8, 2016, 8:29 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/08/497164736/how-do-you-go-about-suing-a-country [https://perma
.cc/94MW-MQFZ] (describing purpose of state immunity). It is preferred that disputes between
two states "be resolved at the diplomatic stage as opposed to the private civil litigation stage." Id.
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2015) (defining immunity of foreign state from United States
jurisdiction). "Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
Id.
I..."
of the United States and of the States .
RS22094, LAWSUITS AGAINST STATE SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM: AN OVERVIEW, 1 (2005)
(describing Foreign Sovereigns Immunity Act).
Ordinarily, foreign States, including their agencies and instrumentalities, may not be
sued in U.S. courts unless they waive their sovereign immunity or an exception under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq.) applies. The
FSIA provides a list of circumstances where U.S. federal courts will not recognize
foreign sovereign immunity. In these circumstances, U.S. courts may exercise
jurisdiction over a dispute and treat a foreign state as if it were a private entity.
Id.; see Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Upholds Narrow Construction ofForeign Immunity
Law in Terrorism Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2018, 2:14 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com
/2018/02/opinion-analysis-court-upholds-narrow-construction-foreign-immunity-aw-terrrismcase/ [https://perma.cc/6VB2-WNCM ] (processing case history of FSIA terrorism exception case).
3 891 F.3d 6(lst Cir. 2018).
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killing of a United States citizen that Cuba allegedly committed.4 The First
Circuit held that the previous default judgment against Cuba for allegedly
committing the extrajudicial killing lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and
could not be enforced. 5
In October 1963, Geoffrey Sullivan, who served in the United States
Air Force and the Army National Guard, disappeared.6 This prompted his
daughter, Sherry Sullivan ("Sullivan") to attempt to uncover what happened
to her father by gathering evidence pertaining to his disappearance. 7 Sullivan
concluded that during a mission against Cuba, her father was captured,
imprisoned, and later died in custody.8 This provoked Sullivan to sue the

4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)
immunity of foreign states).

(2008) (providing terrorism exception to jurisdictional

A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States ... which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury
or death that was caused by an act of torture, [or] extrajudicial killing... is engaged in
by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency.
Id; see Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 11-12 (finding that terrorism exception does not apply); see also
Ruthanne M. Deutsch, Suing State-Sponsorsof Terrorism Under the Foreign SovereignImmunities
Act: Giving Life to the Jurisdictional Grant After Cicippio-Puleo, 38 INT'L LAWYER 891, 891
(2004), available at https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2307&context-til
[https://perma.cc/HU9R-MQQC] (explaining option to sue foreign states after acts of terrorism).
"In 1996, Congress enacted legislation to allow American citizens harmed by terrorist acts to use
the U.S. courts to seek money damages from the responsible state sponsors of terrorism." Deutsch,
supra note 4, at 891.
' See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 10 (affirming dismissal of action). Sullivan failed to prove that
Cuba was not immune to the action. Id. at 9. If a FSIA exception does not apply, the foreign state
will be immune from any lawsuits because the exceptions present the only basis to get jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign. Id. (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993); Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)).
6 See Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 289 F. Supp. 3d 231, 233 (D. Me. 2017), affd 891 F.3d 6
(1st Cir. 2018) (explaining Geoffrey Sullivan's past).
7 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 8 (stating plaintiffs research). Sullivan discovered the timeline of
her father's death by "contacting dozens of federal agencies and officials and filing a Freedom of
Information Act ("FOIA") request." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Sullivan also had
evidence that her father died in 1982 while in the custody of the Cuban government, which was a
significant time later than his disappearance date in October 1963. Id. at 7-8.
8 See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 234 (describing evidence revealing Geoffrey Sullivan was
shot down and imprisoned in Cuba). The evidence presented included: (1) a variety of reports
stating that someone resembling Geoffrey Sullivan was taken aboard a Cuban vessel; (2) United
States Department of State records describing rumors from Cuban refugees that Geoffrey Sullivan
crashed his plane near Cuba; (3) reports from Americans who were imprisoned in Cuba stating that
the name Sullivan sounded familiar; (4) a report from an American pilot stating he was detained in
Cuba next to an American claiming to be "Mr. Sullivan" who was detained for "almost ten years;"
(5) a radio talk show report detailing that Geoffrey Sullivan was engaged in combat with a Cuban
governmental aircraft when he was shot down; (6) a previously imprisoned Cuban 6migr6 statement
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9
defendant, the Republic of Cuba ("Cuba"), in 2007 for wrongful death.
Despite being properly served, Cuba did not appear in Maine Superior Court,
and Sullivan was subsequently awarded "$21 million in damages for loss of
support, severe emotional distress, and damages to her father's estate,
including compensation for his pain and suffering."" °
Despite the judgment, Sullivan was unable to collect any of her
awarded damages from Cuba and sought to enforce the default judgment in
11 The federal
the United States District Court for the District of Maine.
district court asked Sullivan to determine if there was proper subject matter
jurisdiction for the original action and to provide sufficient evidence of the
extrajudicial killing. 12 After hearing Sullivan's arguments, the court denied
the motion for default judgment, dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and found that Geoffrey Sullivan was not extrajudicially killed
by Cuba.13

to the FBI and CIA that an American had been at a prison hospital seeking treatment for bums after
the time of Geoffrey Sullivan's disappearance; and (7) two previously imprisoned Cuban
Americans statements describing that there was a prisoner named "Sullivan" in 1991. Id.
9 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 7 (explaining initial suit brought by plaintiff in Maine Superior
Court). The state court claimed to have subject matter jurisdiction because it concluded that Cuba
did not have immunity from the case as it committed an extrajudicial killing, which falls under the
terrorism exception of the FSIA. Id. at 8. The state court also found that Sullivan could be entitled
to damages because she is "the successor to, heir to and guardian of her father's estate." Id.(quoting
Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 233).
'0 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 8 (describing outcome of wrongful death suit). The Maine Superior
Court agreed with the proposed facts and legal conclusions presented by Sullivan regarding the
background information of her father's disappearance. Id.On August 10, 2009, the Maine Superior
Court entered a default judgment for Sullivan. Id.Before Sullivan was awarded damages, a hearing
was conducted in which Cuba again did not appear for, prompting the Maine Superior Court to
award Sullivan the damages. Id.
11 See id. at 8-9 (outlining process Sullivan took after damages were awarded). On June 21,
2016, Sullivan filed suit to enforce the default judgment, however, despite being properly served,
Cuba again failed to appear. Id Sullivan moved for entry of default on May 12, 2017. Id.
12 See id.
at 9 (interpreting district court's concern about validity of default judgment). A
hearing was scheduled on August 28, 2017 for the district court to analyze Sullivan's arguments.
Id.

13 See id.
(explaining why case was without merit). At the August 28, 2017 hearing, Sullivan
attempted to support her case by presenting herself and an attorney as a witness, in addition to
several exhibits. Id.Such exhibits included a letter from Sullivan's mother providing information
that Geoffrey Sullivan was in a plane crash and later imprisoned in Cuba, "second- and third-hand
reports" of Geoffrey Sullivan allegedly being in Cuban prisons, notes from the show Unsolved
Mysteries regarding Geoffrey Sullivan's disappearance, and other governmental documents which
Id.(citing Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 289 F.
confirmed Geoffrey Sullivan's disappearance.
Supp. 3d 231, 237-38 (D. Me. 2017), aff'd 891 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Despite the evidence, the district court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case because Sullivan failed to support her argument that the terrorism exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act applied. Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 244.
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In 1976, the Foreign Sovereigns Immunities Act set the legal
standard for foreign state immunity in civil actions. 14 As a result of this
immunity, plaintiffs are forced to find an exception that will allow them to
sue a foreign sovereign nation.' 5 In 2008, Congress amended the FSIA to
add the terrorism exception, which gave plaintiffs a greater opportunity to
sue foreign states. 16 However, for a court to hear a claim under the terrorism
exception, the state being sued must be a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time of the specific act or when the claim was filed.17 Thus, if a plaintiff is

14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) (setting immunity standard for foreign sovereigns); see also
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1983) (explaining purpose of
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). The Act was passed "to free the Government from the caseby-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to [assure] litigants that...
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process .... "
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 488. If,
however, an exception under 28 U.S.C. § 1605 or 28 U.S.C. § 1607 applies, the foreign sovereign
might not be immune from legal actions. Id.
A foreign state is normally immune from the jurisdiction of federal and state courts...
subject to a set of exceptions specified in §§ 1605 and 1607. Those exceptions include
actions in which the foreign state has explicitly or impliedly waived its immunity...
and actions based upon commercial activities of the foreign sovereign carried on in the
United States or causing a direct effect in the United States .... When one of these or
the other specified exceptions applies, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.
Id. at 488-89 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 See 28. U.S.C. § 1604 (providing exceptions in sections 1605 to 1607); see also Argentine

Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989) (detailing certain exceptions
that may apply to sovereign immunity). "[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining
A"
rgentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 443
jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court ....
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
[T]he exceptions enumerated in the Act ... include cases involving the waiver of
immunity, § 1605(a)(1), commercial activities occurring in the United States or causing
a direct effect in this country, § 1605(a)(2), property expropriated in violation of
international law, § 1605(a)(3), inherited, gift, or immovable property located in the
United States, § 1605(a)(4), noncommercial torts occurring in the United States, §
1605(a)(5), and maritime liens, § 1605(b).
Id. at 439; see Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 363 (1993) (rejecting respondent's action to
sue Saudi Arabia as FSIA did not confer jurisdiction over suit). The Court found that the tortious
acts that the plaintiff allegedly sustained did not qualify under the Act's commercial activity
exception. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 358.
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2008) (outlining terrorism exception to jurisdictional
immunity of foreign state); see also David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A
Guidefor Judges, FED. JUD. CTR. INT'L LITIG. GuIDE, 81 (2013), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/2014/FSIAGuide2Ol3.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW5Q-9ZEJ] (explaining increase of cases,
especially those against Cuba, after adoption of exception).
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (deciding when terrorism exception applies).
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arguing that an extrajudicial killing occurred, the requisite elements for an
extrajudicial killing must first be proven.18 Then, the plaintiff must also
prove that the state committed the killing when it was a state sponsor of
9
terrorism.'
It is not uncommon for a foreign sovereign to be sued in a United
States court, fail to appear despite being properly served, and have a default

The court shall hear a claim under this section if the foreign state was designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act described in paragraph (1) occurred, or was
so designated as a result of such act, and, subject to subclause (IT), either remains so
designated when the claim is filed under this section or was so designated within the 6month period before the claim is filed under this section.
Id.; see also Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
("Congress aimed to prevent state sponsors of terrorism.., from escaping liability for their sins");
State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF ST., https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl4l5l.htm (last
visited Mar. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YK6Q-TDYY] (listing state sponsors of terrorism).
Currently, North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Syria, are the only state sponsors of terrorism. State
Sponsors of Terrorism,supra note 17.
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(7) (stating extrajudicial killing definition is codified in Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991); Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992)
(defining extrajudicial killing).
[T]he term extrajudicial killing means a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term,
however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully
carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (internal quotations omitted). See Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050-51 (explaining need
for evidence of extrajudicial killings). "Maltreatment is actionable under the FSIA only if
purposeful and particularly harsh and that killings are prohibited only if they occur outside the
limits of the normal legal process." Id. at 1050. Thus, a plaintiffneeds to show sufficient evidence
that the killing was done by the government without a formal legal process. Id. at 1051; see also
Mamam v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding no showing of extrajudicial
killing). Plaintiffs must produce sufficient facts that the killing was deliberately committed by the
government. Mamani, 654 F.3d at 1155; see also Shoham v. Islamic Republic oflran, No. 12-cv508, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84119, at *34-37 (D.D.C. June 1, 2017) (finding Iran not entitled to
sovereign immunity as rock throwing was deemed as extrajudicial killing).
19 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (approved Nov. 8, 2019) (requiring state sponsor of
terrorism); see also Krishnadev Calamur, Who's On the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and
Why, NPR (Apr. 15, 2015, 12:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/04/15
[https://perma.cc/8LJH/399809412/whos-on-the-list-of-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-and-why
LZZ5] (discussing nations considered state sponsors of terrorism and rationale for why they are
listed). In 2015, President Obama removed Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism. Calamur, supra
note 19. "Cuba was previously accused by the State Department of being a safe haven for armed
left-wing groups from Columbia and Spain... there was no indication that the Cuban government
provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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judgment entered against them.20 Whereas a default judgment might seem
like an agreeable outcome to the plaintiff, it actually requires the federal
court to inspect the claim for jurisdiction before attempting to seek the
default judgment. 21 For that reason, courts always have to determine if
jurisdiction is proper, and if the claim is being enforced against a foreign
sovereign under the terrorism exception of the FSIA, the court must
determine if that exception even applies. 2 Despite the fact that a default
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (entailing default judgment); see e.g. Vera v. Republic of Cuba,

91 F. Supp. 3d 561, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting prior default judgments granted to plaintiffs);
McCarthy v. Republic of Cuba, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1347-48 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (granting default
judgment on sixty-seven million dollar award for plaintiff whose husband was extrajudicially
killed); Colvin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 363 F. Supp. 3d 141, 146 (D.D.C. 2019) (understanding
default judgment entered against Syria for failing to appear); see also Laurel Pyke Malson et al.,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: 2009 Year in Review, CROWELL & MORING LLP, 36
(2010),
https://www.crowell.com/files/The-Foreign-Sovereign-Immunities-Act-2009-Year-inReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBF6-96TD] (explaining reasoning behind courts granting default
judgments). Default judgments "are not uncommon in foreign sovereign litigation, as foreign states
often choose to ignore claims asserted against them in U.S. courts, for political, economic, practical,
or other reasons." Malson, supra note 20.
21 See Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 2011)
(requiring courts to consider subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte); see also Coll. Standard
Magazine v. Student Ass'n of State Univ. of N.Y., 610 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (refusing to grant
relief if there is lack of jurisdiction); Hawley v. Murphy, 736 A.2d 268, 271 (Me. 1999) (finding
default judgment may not be enforced if court does not have jurisdiction). "[A]n entry of default
against an individual does not serve as a bar to that individual's right to challenge the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court." Hawley, 736 A.2d at 271.
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) (authorizing courts to have jurisdiction against foreign
states).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section
1603(a) of this title [28 USCS § 1603(a)] as to any claim for relief in personam with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 16051607 of this title [28 USCS §§ 1605-1607] or under any applicable international
agreement.
Id. (alteration in original); see Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983)
(explaining 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) with relation to FSIA). The FSIA allows suits to be brought against
foreign sovereigns in either state or federal court. Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 489.
[FSIA] guarantees foreign states the right to remove any civil action from a state court
to a federal court .... The Act also provides that any claim permitted under the Act may
be brought from the outset in federal court. If one of the specified exceptions to sovereign
immunity applies, a federal district court may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under
§ 1330(a); but if the claim does not fall within one of the exceptions, federal courts lack
subject-matter jurisdiction. In such a case, the foreign state is also ensured immunity
from the jurisdiction of state courts by § 1604.
Id.; see Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reasoning if no statutory exception
applies then court does not have subject matter jurisdiction).
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judgment was already awarded, the plaintiff will not have standing if the
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. If a defendant would like
to remove the default judgment, they have to argue to set the entry of default
aside.24 In addition to the jurisdiction requirement, under the FSIA, a default
judgment will not be granted unless the plaintiff presents satisfactory
evidence to support their claim or right to relief.2

23

See case cited supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing need to inspect claims for

jurisdiction); see also Vera, 867 F.3d at 320 (concluding that Full Faith and Credit Act does not
establish jurisdiction under § 133 l(a)); Espinal-Dominguez v. Puerto Rico, 352 F.3d 490, 495 (1st
Cir. 2003) ("[F]ederal courts are powerless to act in the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction....").
24 See Mary Kay Kane, Suing ForeignSovereigns: A ProceduralCompass, 34 STAN. L. REV.
385, 395 (1982) (stating requirements for defendants who want to set aside entry of default).
[F]our elements support a showing of good cause: (1) there is some excuse for allowing
the default; (2) a meritorious defense to the action exists; (3) the plaintiff will not be
seriously prejudiced if the default is set aside; and (4) the motion was made promptly
upon learning of the default entry.
Id.
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976) (prohibiting default judgment unless claimant establishes
right to relief); see also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751,785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (providing
evidence standard similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d)). "A default judgment may be entered against
the United States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to
relief by evidence that satisfies the court." FED. R. CiV. P. 55(d). The Owens court reasoned that
a "lenient standard is particularly appropriate for a FSIA terrorism case, for which firsthand
evidence and eyewitness testimony is difficult or impossible to obtain from an absent and likely
hostile sovereign." 864 F.3d at 785; see Lasheen v. Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 625
Fed. App'x 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding no abuse of discretion in entering default judgment
because evidence was satisfactory); Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044,
1046 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reconciling unclear standard of what quality of evidence must be produced);
Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948,951
(11 th Cir. 1996) ("[E]stablish entitlement to relief by providing satisfactory evidence as to each
element of the claims upon which relief was sought"); Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (reasoning plaintiffs allegations should be supported by
evidence but no evidentiary hearing requirement); Alameda v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980) ("the quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a
court can be less than that normally required."); but cf Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan, 720 F.3d
199, 210 (4th Cir. 2013) (differentiating from custom of analyzing plaintiff's prima facie case for
satisfactory evidence). "[A] district court may properly take a close look at a plaintiffs case" when
determining if the plaintiff met the satisfactory evidence burden. Clodfelter, 720 F.3d at 210; see
Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (allowing courts to
accept plaintiffs "uncontroverted evidence" to establish claim of relief against foreign states);
Joseph M. Terry, Comment, JurisdictionalDiscovery Under the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act,
66 U. CHi. L. REV. 1029, 1042 (1999) (explaining high evidentiary burden is difficult for plaintiff's
to prove statutory exceptions apply). "Plaintiffs are often unable to prove an exception to the FSIA
without significant discovery. Proof of an exception to immunity is highly fact dependent and may
require evidence that is in the exclusive possession of defendants." Terry, supra note 25, at 1042.
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Judgments might not be enforced in federal court despite the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. 6 The Full Faith
and Credit Clause will not bind a federal court to a state court's finding of
jurisdiction'.2 For example, if a state court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction when entering a default judgment, the federal court will not
enforce the judgment.2 8
In Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba,the court affirmed the dismissal of
the action because Sullivan did not sufficiently prove that Cuba's conduct
fell under the FSIA terrorism exception, resulting in a lack of jurisdiction
over Cuba. 29 However, the court assumed arguendo, that the Full Faith and
26 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 421 (1979) ("A judgment entered in one State must be respected in another provided that the
first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter."); V.L. v. E.L., 136 S.Ct. 1017,
1020 (2016) (analyzing when states can and cannot abide by Full Faith and Credit Clause).
27 See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n.,
455 U.S. 691, 705 (1982) (requiring inquiry into jurisdiction standing of court's judgment).
"[B]efore a court is bound by the judgment rendered in another State, it may inquire into the
jurisdiction basis of the foreign court's decree. If that court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter or the relevant parties, full faith and credit need not be given." Id.; see also Durfee v. Duke,
375 U.S. 106, 110 (1963) ("[A] judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a
court in another State only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits - had
jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment."); Vera, 867 F.3d at 320 (rejecting argument that Full
Faith and Credit Act establishes jurisdiction under § 133 1(a)).
[T]he Full Faith and Credit Act, which requires state court judgments to receive the same
credit, validity, and effect in every other court in the United States, has no bearing on
the question of whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim...
[A]n attempt to obtain a federal judgment on the strength of a state court judgment is not
a case arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that would
trigger federal question jurisdiction.
Vera, 867 F.3d at 320 (citation omitted).
28 See Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("[A] court asked to
enforce a default judgment must entertain an attack on the jurisdiction of the court that issued the
judgment. If it finds that the issuing court lacked jurisdiction, it must vacate the judgment."); see
also Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
("A judgment remains void even after final judgment if the issuing court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, regardless of whether there existed an 'arguable basis' for jurisdiction.").
29 See Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 891 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2018) ("The Republic of Cuba is
presumptively immune from suit unless Sullivan can prove that its alleged conduct falls under one
of the exceptions specified in the FSIA.").
Sullivan argues that the district court erred in dismissing her complaint because the
Maine Superior Court had expressly found that the terrorism exception to the FSIA
applies to the alleged extrajudicial killing of her father. Sullivan asserts that by "'looking
behind' the factual findings of the Maine Judgment and determining... that there was
no evidence of an extra-judicial killing," the district court violated the Full Faith and
Credit Act ("FFCA") ...which requires "judicial proceedings" to be given "the same
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Credit Clause applied and the district court's finding of subject matter
jurisdiction under FSIA was valid.3" Through its analysis, the court
explained that the dismissal of the case was proper under the FSIA for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.31 As a result of its reasoning, the court found
that Sullivan produced insufficient evidence to establish that the FSIA
terrorism exception applied.32 The court even refused to lower the high

full faith and credit in every court within the United States ...as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
We find no error and affirm the dismissal of this action.
Id. at 9-10 (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted); see Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) (explaining how FSIA provides jurisdiction to sue
foreign states in U.S. courts). "[The FSIA] provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a
foreign state in the courts of this country .. " Argentine Republic, 488 U.S. at 443.
30 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 10 (attempting to find valid argument that district court had proper
jurisdiction). The court asserted that Sullivan's best argument was that full faith and credit must
be given because Maine Superior Court awarded her a default judgment. Id This argument,
however, would still fail because default judgments can be attacked on the grounds of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. The court also relied on Me. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) which states, "[w]henever it
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action." Id. As a result, "even if the Maine Superior Court's
default judgment were to be accorded full faith and credit, a federal court would not be precluded
from determining, de novo, whether the state court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter that

judgment." Id. The court used the decisions in Vera and UnderwritersNationalAssurance Co., to

find that when a matter is being brought under the FSIA, "as a matter of federal law, the FFCA
[Full Faith and Credit Act] does not apply to default judgments rendered in excess of the court's

subject matter jurisdiction." Id.; see UnderwritersNat 'lAssurance Co., 455 U.S. at 705 (requiring

inquiry into jurisdictional basis of judgments). "If that court did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter ...full faith and credit need not be given." Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 10 (citing
UnderwritersNat'l Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 705); see Vera, 867 F.3d at 321 (discussing proper

subject matter jurisdiction). As a result, the Sullivan court held that the federal district court is
permitted to "independently review whether Sullivan's case fell within the terrorism exception to
the FSIA," allowing it to determine if jurisdiction is valid. 891 F.3d at 10.
31 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 11 (determining whether dismissal was proper). The court
reviewed "the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." Id.
Acts of terrorism, i.e. extrajudicial killings, allow plaintiffs to sue foreign states under the terrorism
exception of FSIA if sufficient evidence is presented. Id.The court held the dismissal of the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper as the application of the terrorism exception was
not sufficiently proven. Id. at 8.
32 See id at 11 (describing evidence required to prove extrajudicial killing). However, Sullivan
must prove that Cuba extrajudicially killed her father and that Cuba was a state sponsor of terrorism.
Id. The court inferred that the evidence Sullivan produced, at best, showed that her father was
captured and incarcerated by Cuba, not killed. Id. The Maine Superior Court erred in awarding
default judgment despite no evidence of a deliberate killing, which it was not authorized to do under
the FSIA or the Torture Victim Protection Act. Id. Further, Cuba was not even designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism in 1963, which was when Geoffrey Sullivan was legally declared dead
by the United States Social Security Administration. Id.at 8.

2020]

EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS

evidentiary standard of proving an extrajudicial killing to award Sullivan
damages.33
Despite the unfair outcome to Sullivan, the court appropriately
resolved the issue at bar by applying existing case precedent.3 4 When
applying the two-prong test to determine if the terrorism exception to the
FSIA applied, the court correctly held that Sullivan did not produce sufficient
evidence to find that Cuba extrajudicially killed her father.35 As a result, the
court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
held that it was not bound by the Full Faith and Credit Act.36 While it is

" See id. at 12 (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction as terrorism exception does not
apply). The court rejected Sullivan's suggestion to lower the evidentiary standard of producing
evidence that an extrajudicial killing occurred. Id. at 11. The court stated Sullivan misread Kim,
which supported a more lenient evidentiary standard. Id. The Kim court stated, "[r]equiring a
plaintiff to produce direct, first-hand evidence of the victim's torture and murder would... thwart
the purpose of the terrorism exception: holding state sponsors of terrorism accountable for torture
and extrajudicial killing." Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 774 F.3d 1044, 1045
(D.C. Cir. 2014). The Sullivan court found that even though Sullivan was not required to produce
direct firsthand evidence that her father was murdered, she still did not produce enough evidence.
891 F.3d at 12. "Sullivan failed to provide any evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that the
Cuban government killed her father after keeping him incarcerated for at least twenty years, let
alone that Cuba acted extrajudicially." Id.
14 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 11-12 (dismissing suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see
also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989) (providing
that jurisdiction over foreign sovereign is only proper under FSIA); Vera, 867 F.3d at 320
(determining jurisdiction is still required when enforcing state judgment); Jerez v. Republic of
Cuba, 775 F.3d 419, 422-23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (clarifying full faith and credit is not binding on
federal courts regarding determination ofjurisdiction); Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050-51 (requiring some
type of evidence supporting foreign sovereign killing of another without due process); Mamani v.
Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1155 (1 lth Cir. 2011) (relying on deliberate, not accidental, evidence for
extrajudicial killing); Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 287 (2d
Cir. 2011) (explaining court requirement to always evaluate whether subject matter jurisdiction is
proper).
15 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 11-12 (holding that claim will fail without showing of sufficient
evidence that exception applies); see also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 864 F.3d 751, 779 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (allowing default judgment only if claimant establishes evidence satisfying to court);
Lasheen v. Embassy of The Arab Republic of Egypt, 625 F. App'x 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2015)
(allowing default judgment as plaintiff alleged satisfactory evidence); Kim, 774 F.3d at 1050-51
(recognizing evidence supporting allegation that extrajudicial killing was committed); Mamani,
654 F.3d at 1155 (requiring evidence of intentional extrajudicial killing); Compania Interamericana
Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996)
(mandating satisfactory evidence for each wanted relief); Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring allegations to be supported by evidence); Saludes
v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (permitting affidavit as partial
proof of plaintiff's evidence).
36 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 12 (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see
also Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 455
U.S. 691, 705 (1982) (allowing courts to not award Full Faith and Credit if prior court was without
jurisdiction); Vera, 867 F.3d at 320 (refusing to apply Full Faith and Credit Act if jurisdiction is
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unfortunate that Sullivan did not obtain relief for her father's death, there
must be a standard to hold a foreign sovereign accountable for alleged
horrendous acts.37
The crux of this case turned on whether there was sufficient evidence
of the extrajudicial killing that warranted Sullivan to be awarded the default
judgment.3 8 This is because the only way for a United States court to have
jurisdiction over Cuba is for Sullivan to produce sufficient evidence that her
father was extrajudicially killed, as required under the terrorism exception of
the FSIA.39 The court relied on precedent to determine if the evidence was
sufficient and held that the evidence produced was inadequate to show
Geoffrey Sullivan was killed by Cuba, because it merely speculated how he
died and did not prove that Cuba actually caused his death.4" This
not proper); Jerez, 775 F.3d at 423 (determining default judgments are not bound by Full Faith and
Credit Act if improper jurisdiction); Hawley v. Murphy, 736 A.2d 268,271 (Me. 1999) (finding no
bar to subject matter jurisdiction challenge despite default judgment entered).
17 See § 1605A(a)(1) (holding foreign states accountable for acts of extrajudicial killings); see
also Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 7-8 (describing Sullivan's struggle to learn what happened to her father).
"[Sullivan] has... dedicated much of her life to discovering the truth about [her father's]
disappearance, including contacting dozens of federal agencies and officials and filing a Freedom
of Information Act... request." Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 7-8 (internal quotation omitted). The court
required Sullivan to meet the test under § 1605A(a)(1). Id. at 11. It expected Sullivan to show
proof "that (1) Cuba committed an 'extrajudicial killing,' which is defined. . . as 'a deliberated
killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,' and
that (2) Cuba was 'designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the [extrajudicial killing]
occurred'...." Id.(citations omitted) (alteration in original).
38 See Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 9 (reviewing federal district court's holding). The court found that
Sullivan failed to provide evidence that proved Geoffrey Sullivan was killed deliberately by Cuba.
Id.at 11. The court found "[t]he record... empty of 'any evidence that [Sullivan's] father was the
victim of an intentional killing by Cuba and that any such killing was committed in the absence of
legal process."' Id.(quoting Sullivan v. Republic of Cuba, 289 F. Supp. 3d 231, 244 (D. Me. 2017),
affid 891 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2018)) (alteration in original).
" See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 244-45 (concluding insufficient evidence presented to apply
terrorism exception). The court found that, "[e]ven accepting as true Sullivan's uncontroverted
evidence, which is mired in multiple levels of hearsay and often relies on speculation, she has
shown, at best, that her father was incarcerated in Cuba after the date when Cuba was placed on the
state sponsors of terrorism list. Id.; see Deutsch, supra note 4, at 903 (describing process of
determining liability under FSIA). "First, plaintiffs must satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite by
establishing that the conditions of one of the relevant exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity are
met. Second, liability must be proven for the specific relief that is sought ...." Deutsch, supra
note 4, at 903.
40 See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 243-44 (comparing Sullivan's evidence to precedent). The
court states that an error occurs when there is a "clearly erroneous factual finding" and such factual
finding is relied upon, as in Vera. Id. at 243 (citing Vera, 867 F.3d at 317). The court also permits
a somewhat "lenient" approach when determining if evidence is sufficient for the terrorism
exception of FSIA, but it cannot be too lenient. Id. at 244.
In Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea... [i]n determining that the
plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to support their claim, the appeals court
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requirement is at an appropriate threshold because it would be unfair to sue
foreign sovereigns for acts that cannot be supported by sufficient evidence.4 '
The court's decision may have an effect on future cases, as any
prospective plaintiff (1) must ensure that they have sufficient evidence to
prove an extrajudicial killing occurred, and (2) that the accused country is a
state sponsor of terrorism.42 If Sullivan appealed this to the Supreme Court,
she would have needed to locate additional evidence that supported her
argument that Cuba extrajudicially killed her father during the time Cuba
was a state sponsor of terrorism.43 Thus, despite the difficulty in finding
stated that evidentiary standards must necessarily be relaxed where a foreign sovereign
like North Korea has "made [the victim] unavailable to testify on his own behalf, refused
to appear in court and subject itself to discovery, and is known to intimidate defectors
and potential witnesses."
Id. (quoting Kim, 774 F.3d at 1048) (second alteration in original). The Sullivan court further
determined that the plaintiffs in Kim presented "circumstantial evidence that their relative had been
tortured and killed," while Sullivan did not do so. 289 F. Supp. 3d at 234. Sullivan only produced
evidence that Geoffrey Sullivan "was shot down over Cuba," and was "imprisoned by the Castro
regime." Id.
41 See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 245 (stating Sullivan's failure to provide sufficient evidence
of extrajudicial killing).
[S]ullivan's failure to present any evidence that her father was extrajudicially killed by
Cuba would mean that she has failed to "establish her claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court." This Court recognizes that some degree of leniency in
assessing evidentiary burdens is warranted in a situation, such as this one, in which a
plaintiff has understandable difficulty getting information out of a secretive and hostile
nation.
Id. (original alterations omitted) (citation omitted); see also Howe, supra note 2 (explaining
difficulty on winning claim under FSIA's terrorism exception); but cf Terry, supra note 25, at
1055-56 (providing alternative for plaintiffs to produce sufficient evidence). Providing that
plaintiffs should be required to prove "some... evidence exists" and that through discovery, more
evidence will be found and will make it easier for the plaintiff to establish their case. Terry, supra
note 25, at 1056.
42 See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 237-39 (explaining evidence that was later deemed
insufficient). The court emphasized that the second and third-hand reports, the heavily redacted
government documents, and a Social Security Administration document declaring Geoffrey
Sullivan dead in 1963, was not sufficient to meet the threshold needed to prove that Cuba
extrajudicially killed him. Id.; see also Elsea, supra note 2, at 2 (describing difficulty of success
against designated State sponsors of terrorism); Howe, supra note 2 (explaining Supreme Court
denial to be lenient with FSIA terrorism exception); Calamur, supra note 19 (explaining why Cuba
was removed from state sponsor of terrorism list).
43 See Sullivan, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 245-46 (stating court cannot find extrajudicial killing with
evidence presented). "[T]he record before this Court lacks any evidence.., that Geoffrey Sullivan
was deliberately subjected to poor conditions that caused his death. Nor can this Court simply infer
from his detention that Geoffrey Sullivan was killed in the absence of legal process." Id. Sullivan
would need to find evidence that Geoffrey Sullivan was killed by Cuba when Cuba was a designated
state sponsor of terrorism in 1982. Sullivan, 891 F.3d at 11.
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sufficient evidence to prove a foreign sovereign committed an extrajudicial
killing, this decision will help future plaintiffs gauge how much evidence is
sufficient to be awarded judgment under the FSIA terrorism exception.'
Sufficient evidence must be presented to establish that a sovereign
killed a United States citizen. Without such evidence,
extrajudicially
nation
courts will not have the proper subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
judgments against sovereign states. The Sullivan court correctly found that
the FSIA and its exceptions do not provide subject matter jurisdiction over
Cuba. Despite the high standard of evidence required, it is justifiable to hold
proper sovereigns accountable for their actions when there is adequate proof.
Stephanie M Sader

44 See Malson, supra note 20, at 37 (discussing difficulty foreign sovereigns have in
overturning default judgments); see also Kane, supra note 24, at 415 (criticizing plaintiff and
defendant burdens of proof).

Congress envisioned a more complex scheme in which the foreign state merely has the
burden to produce prima facie evidence of immunity... [and] the plaintiff must show
that the state's activities fall into one of the statutory exceptions to immunity, and the
state retains the ultimate burden of proving immunity. How these rather artificial shifting
burdens will operate is yet to be seen.
Kane, supra note 24, at 415-16.

